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JAY ALIX, MCKINSEY, AND A LACK OF CLARITY
ABSTRACT
Jay Alix v. McKinsey & Co. is the product of a gaping hole in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code: its extensive definition section does not adequately define
various key words, including “professional persons” and “disinterested
persons.” McKinsey & Co., one of the world’s largest and wealthiest consulting
firms, stands accused of violating the disinterested standard set out in 11 U.S.C.
§ 327(a) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2014(a). McKinsey,
however, maintains that it fully complied with the Bankruptcy Code
requirements, and it may well be right; depending on the jurisdiction, and even
on the individual judge, the disinterested and disclosure requirements to be
employed under the Bankruptcy Code may vary.
Previous bankruptcy courts have not applied a clear, consistent standard
regarding which entities are subject to the Bankruptcy Code requirements by
virtue of being a professional person under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), what constitutes
a disinterested person under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), or what exactly an entity must
disclose under Bankruptcy Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 2014(a) prior to
bankruptcy employment. However, the court has just such an opportunity in Jay
Alix v. McKinsey & Co. Neglecting to use this opportunity to clarify the
Bankruptcy Code could lead to further lawsuits between bankruptcy
practitioners, as well as forum shopping by bankruptcy participants, all in an
effort to hide potentially significant connections. This Comment proposes that
the court should adopt firm standards for both definitional issues, as well as the
disclosure requirement, to ensure a fair, transparent bankruptcy process that is
in accordance with the original goals of the Code and the bankruptcy system as
a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 9, 2018, bankruptcy turnaround expert Jay Alix filed suit against
McKinsey & Co. in the Southern District of New York regarding the actions of
McKinsey’s restructuring group.1 In this suit, Jay Alix—the founder and largest
individual shareholder of AlixPartners, a major consulting firm and “turnaround
veteran”—alleged that McKinsey & Co.—also a worldwide consulting firm that
has recently grown its turnaround group—“conducted a criminal enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity” by “knowingly and intentionally”
submitting false and material declarations under oath in bankruptcy
proceedings.2 Alix claims that McKinsey submitted these false and material
declarations in order to conceal “significant connections” to interested parties in
bankruptcy proceedings and to avoid revealing conflicts of interest that would
preclude it from being hired as a bankruptcy professional in those proceedings.3
Because of these alleged false and misleading declarations, Alix brought suit
alleging racketeering activity, including bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152(3), and 152(6); mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341; wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; obstruction of justice in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a); witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1512(b) and 1512(c); unlawful monetary transactions in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957; and inducement to interstate or foreign travel in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.4 While this initial suit has since been dismissed,
Alix appears to be continuing his charge, noting after the dismissal that the judge
did not rule on the merits and that he would continue to litigate these allegations
in other cases.5
This is not the first such case brought against McKinsey for similar activities.
This kind of litigation has been an ongoing problem for McKinsey that gained
broader nationwide attention following the publication of a recent Wall Street
Journal article highlighting the firm’s secretive nature and unwillingness to
disclose information about clients.6 The article highlights just how differently

1
Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Alix v. McKinsey & Co., 404 F. Supp. 3d 827 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No.
1:18-cv-04141).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 2.
5
Tom Hals, Judge Dismisses Turnaround Guru’s Racketeering Case vs McKinsey, REUTERS (Aug. 19,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mckinsey-alixpartners-racketeering/judge-dismisses-turnaroundgurus-racketeering-case-vs-mckinsey-idUSKCN1V91S1.
6
Gretchen Morgenson & Tom Corrigan, McKinsey Is Big in Bankruptcy — and Highly Secretive, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mckinsey-is-big-in-bankruptcyand-highly-secretive1524847720?mod=article_inline; see, e.g., Mar-Bow Value Partners, LLC v. McKinsey Recovery &
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McKinsey views the disclosure requirements as compared to traditional law
firms and other groups involved in the bankruptcy process. For example, during
the GenOn Energy bankruptcy, Kirkland & Ellis billed 105 hours for
connections and conflict disclosures.7 McKinsey, in contrast, billed five—
although it claims this is because the firm does not bill for administrative staffers
who check for connections.8 Similarly, in the Edison Mission Energy
bankruptcy, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld disclosed 368 connections, while
McKinsey disclosed none.9 McKinsey has responded to criticism of this lack of
disclosure by stating that it cannot “disclose services performed for some
interested parties because of its responsibility to maintain strict client
confidentiality.”10 In response to this behavior—which continued in a similar
vein in the Alpha Natural Resources’ bankruptcy—and urging by Jay Alix, the
U.S. Trustee in Virginia criticized McKinsey’s disclosure statements as “vague
and amorphous.”11 Further, according to the U.S. Trustee, McKinsey “gives the
appearance of compliance without actually complying.”12 The findings from the
Wall Street Journal’s exposé are featured in multiple places in Alix’s suit against
McKinsey.13
This article, and the resulting suit against McKinsey, have brought attention
to two definitional issues that not only resulted in the issue underlying this suit,
but also plague law firms and other entities involved in the bankruptcy process.
First, what does mean for an entity to be “disinterested,” and second, who must
go through the disinterested tests and procedures as set out in 11 U.S.C. § 327(a)
and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2014(a) (“Rule 2014”). This
Comment explores who is considered to be a professional under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, what is required to be disinterested according to the Code,
and finally, the level of disclosures required under Rule 2014. First, this
Comment delves into what it means for a party to be a professional person under
the Code. Second, this Comment addresses how the Code defines disinterested
and how this definition, which lacks specificity, has given rise to numerous
lawsuits and a split among courts. Third, this Comment considers the various
Transformation Servs. US, LLC, 578 B.R. 325 (E.D. Va. 2017).
7
Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
11
Tom Corrigan & Jacqueline Palank, Bankruptcy Watchdogs Say McKinsey’s Disclosures Are
Inadequate, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankruptcy-watchdogs-say-mckinseydisclosures-are-inadequate-1463516707?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=3&mod=article_inline
(internal
quotations omitted).
12
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
13
See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 4–5.
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formulations for the amount of disclosures required under Rule 2014. Finally,
this Comment suggests that the various courts involved in the ongoing
bankruptcy and civil suits between Alix and McKinsey, particularly in Alix v.
McKinsey & Co., should adopt clear, easy-to-follow tests that provide a
consistent standard to these questions across circuits. In establishing a consistent
standard, the court should: 1) adopt the six-part test for a professional set out by
the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re American Tissue,
Inc.;14 2) adopt the strict definition of disinterested as set out by the Fourth
Circuit in In re Martin;15 3) require an extensive level of disclosure similar to
the amount set forth by the standard established by the Eleventh Circuit in In re
Jennings;16 and 4) rule for Jay Alix in his case against McKinsey & Co.
A. Background
The Bankruptcy Code sets out requirements for the employment of attorneys
and professional persons during the bankruptcy process. First, under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1107(a), the power of a debtor in possession to employ attorneys and
professionals is the same as that of a trustee.17 Accordingly, the debtor-inpossession “may employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers,
auctioneers, or other professional persons.”18 Additionally, if the trustee or
debtor in possession, by virtue of § 1107(a), is authorized to run the business
under 11 U.S.C. § 1108 and the debtor has “regularly employed attorneys,
accountants, or other professional persons on salary, the trustee may retain or
replace such professional persons if necessary in the operation of such
business.”19
Professionals must satisfy two requirements: 1) they must not hold interests
adverse to the estate; and 2) they must be disinterested.20 Additionally, the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure state that, to be employed as a
professional, an application must be filed that details all of the person’s
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective
attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in
the office of the United States trustee.21 This application must be accompanied

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

See infra Section A1.
See infra Section A2.
See infra Section A3.
U.S. Trustee v. Price Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)).
11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2019).
§ 327(b).
§ 327(a).
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) (2018).
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by a verified statement of the person to be employed setting forth the person’s
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective
attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in
the office of the United States trustee.22 The Bankruptcy Code defines a
“disinterested person” as one that: 1) “is not a creditor, an equity security holder,
or an insider;” and 2) “does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest
of the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of
any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor,
or for any other reason.”23 Despite this definition, questions remain over who
exactly qualifies as a disinterested person, as well as to whom this standard
applies, considering the lack of clarity in who is under the classification of
“professional person.” Additionally, there is disagreement between courts as to
the proper amount of disclosures that are required under Rule 2014; must the
professional seeking employment detail every possible connection, or only those
that present the threat of an actual conflict of interest?
1. Who is a Professional Person?
The first issue that must be considered in the case of Alix v. McKinsey & Co.
is what exactly the Bankruptcy Code means when it refers to a “professional
person.” 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) states that the trustee may employ “attorneys,
accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not
hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested
persons.”24 Furthermore, Rule 2014(a) states that to be employed under
§ 327(a), “attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other
professionals” must file an application for employment that details “the person’s
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective
attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in
the office of the United States trustee.”25 These provisions are the full extent to
which the Bankruptcy Code deals with a requirement that parties be
disinterested. It is clear that attorneys, accountants, and appraisers must abide
by the standards set out in § 327(a), but it is not clear what the Code means by
the catch-all term “professional persons,” as it is not specifically defined in the
Code.26 Courts have held a wide array of professionals to be “professional
22

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (2019).
24
§ 327(a).
25
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) (2018).
26
Harner, Michelle M., Final Report of the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, AM.
BANKR. INST. (2014), https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context=
books.
23
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persons,” including a management firm, a consultant for oil and gas properties,
a firm specializing in health care receivables and collection services, realtors, a
media broker engaged in the sale of a radio station, a company operating a radio
station, and a head hunter.27 To better determine what Congress meant when it
included the catch-all provision at the end of § 327(a) allowing the hiring of
“other professional persons,” it is helpful to look at both the history of the term
“professional,” as well as how other courts—both state and federal—have
defined the term.
The question of who qualifies as a professional stems from medieval times,
originating with the guild system and the training of lawyers, doctors, and
theologians at universities.28 While there are not many specific definitions of a
professional in federal laws, there are a couple statutory definitions from federal
labor and tort laws. One of the few places that the federal government has
provided greater definitional clarification on what constitutes a professional is
§ 152(12) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which defines a professional
as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and
varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical,
or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion
and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the
output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in
relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an
advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by
a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in
an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a
general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training
in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes;
or (b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized
intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph
(a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a
professional person to qualify himself to become a professional
employee as defined in paragraph (a).29

However, this definition has seldom been applied by tort malpractice cases and
is generally used in administrative cases by the Department of Labor.30

27
Regina Stango Kelbon et al., Conflicts, The Appointment of “Professionals,” and Fiduciary Duties of
Major Parties in Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 349, 376–77 (1991).
28
See generally Michael J. Polelle, Who’s On First, and What’s a Professional?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 205,
212 (1999).
29
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (2018).
30
See Polelle, supra note 28, at 218 n.87.
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State law may also provide some guidance on how to define a professional.
Generally, states follow one of three tests for whether an individual/entity
qualifies as a professional under malpractice law: 1) to limit the definition of
professional to those occupations recognized as such by the common law; 2) to
include as professions all occupations licensed by the state; or 3) to use some
intermediate approach.31
a. State Treatment of Professional Persons
This first approach limits the definition of a professional to those recognized
under early common law: doctors, lawyers, teachers, and clergy; however,
legislatures may expand who is considered a professional.32 The second
approach is a broad definition, holding every occupation licensed by a
governmental entity to be a professional.33 Most states have not adopted either
of these approaches, but have instead adopted various intermediate positions,
including relying on the dictionary for a definition. The New York state courts,
for example, state that a professional is:
[D]istinguished by the requirements of extensive formal training and
learning, admission to practice by a qualifying licensure, a code of
ethics imposing standards qualitatively and extensively beyond those
. . . tolerated in the marketplace, [and] a system for discipline of its
members for violation of the code of ethics . . . .34

Florida, in contrast, has a bright-line rule: “a ‘profession’ is any vocation
requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing is possible
in Florida[;]” however, there is no requirement that the four-year degree be
specifically related to the employment in question.35 Effectively, this creates a
two-part test: first, the profession must be one that requires a license under
Florida law, and second, the license must require the completion of a four-year
degree.36
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a professional as “[a] person who belongs
to a learned profession or whose occupation requires a high level of training and

31

Id. at 218–19.
Polelle, supra note 28, at 219.
33
Id.
34
Hosp. Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D.N.J. 1992) (citing In re
Estate of Freeman (Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Freeman), 311 N.E.2d 480, 483 (1974)).
35
Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 1992).
36
See Polelle, supra note 28, at 223 n.114.
32
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proficiency.”37 The Fifth Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary expanded on this
definition and redefined a profession as:
A vocation or occupation requiring special, usually advanced,
education and skill. The labor and skill involved in a profession is
predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual.
The term originally contemplated only theology, law and medicine,
but as applications of science and learning are extended to other
departments of affairs, other vocations also receive the name, which
implies professed attainments in special knowledge as distinguished
from mere skill.38

b. Bankruptcy Treatment of Professional Persons: Quantitative and
Qualitative Tests
Generally, bankruptcy courts define professional in one of two ways.39 The
first is a so-called quantitative test that focuses on whether the entity plays a
central role in the administration of the estate,40 while the second is a qualitative
test that focuses on whether the entity is given “discretion or autonomy . . . in
some part of administration of the debtor’s estate . . . .”41 The quantitative test,
first set out in the case In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., stated that, for the purposes of
§ 327(a), “professional person” only applies to “persons in those occupations
which play a central role in the administration of the debtor proceeding.”42 In
this case, the question arose regarding whether a court order was necessary for
the retention of maritime engineers by the debtor Seatrain.43 The court declined
to extend § 327(a)’s requirement to the maritime engineers, stating that court
approval is only required for “professions intimately involved in the
administration of the debtor’s estate,” in addition to those specifically listed in
§ 327(a).44 The court conceded that while the maritime engineers play an
important role in the operation of Seatrain’s business, their retention would not
affect the administration of Seatrain’s reorganization, and thus were not subject

37
In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1226
(7th ed. 1999)).
38
In re Metro. Hosp., 119 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1089–
90 (5th ed. 1979)).
39
Harner, supra note 26.
40
In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. at 173; see In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., 13 B.R. 980, 981 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y
1981).
41
In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. at 173 (setting out six factors to be considered in determining whether
an entity is a professional); see In re Fretheim, 102 B.R. 298, 299 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
42
In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., 13 B.R. at 981.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 981 (specifically listed parties include attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and auctioneers).
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to § 327(a).45 The same court, applying the same test in a later case stated that
an entity was not a professional if it did not play any part in negotiating a plan,
adjusting the debtor/creditor relationship, disposing of or acquiring assets, or
performing any other duties of a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.46
Other courts, however, dismiss this quantitative test as “difficult to apply
and subject to arbitrary and inconsistent results . . . .”47 Instead, they use the
qualitative test which states that, for § 327(a) to be applicable, first, “an
employee’s function must be related to the administration of the debtor’s
estate.”48 Then, it must be determined whether an employee has “discretion or
autonomy in some part of the administration of the debtor’s estate.”49 Under this
analysis, approval must be sought for the employment of a person with a
relatively small task but a large measure of discretion in performing it, but not
sought for a person who is to perform an important but nondiscretionary task.50
In the case In re Fretheim, there was disagreement regarding whether a land
surveyor hired by the debtor required approval of the bankruptcy court.51 The
court concluded that “[a] surveyor performs an essentially mechanical,
nondiscretionary task[,]” and therefore “court approval is not required under
§ 327(a).”52 In addition to believing the qualitative test was easier to apply, the
court adopted this test because it is “consistent with a primary purpose of
§ 327(a) to prevent conflicts of interest which erode the confidence of the parties
in the administration of the estate,” as well as “public confidence in the
administration of justice in bankruptcy courts.”53
Still more courts have combined the two, stating that the quantitative and
qualitative analyses need not be mutually exclusive.54 In this combined test,
courts use the following six-factor analysis to determine whether an entity or
person is a professional:
(1) whether the employee controls, manages, administers, invests,
purchases or sells assets that are significant to the debtor’s
reorganization, (2) whether the employee is involved in negotiating the

45

Id.
Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants v. Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 612, 620–21 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y 1986).
47
In re Fretheim, 102 B.R. 298, 299 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
48
Id.
49
Id.; see also In re Semenza, 121 B.R. 56, 57 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
50
In re Fretheim, 102 B.R. at 299.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. (internal alterations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
54
In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp., 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *7–8 (Bankr. D. Del. 1997).
46
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terms of a Plan of Reorganization, (3) whether the employment is
directly related to the type of work carried out by the debtor or to the
routine maintenance of the debtor’s business operations; (4) whether
the employee is given discretion or autonomy to exercise his or her
own professional judgment in some part of the administration of the
debtor’s estate, . . ., (5) the extent of the employee’s involvement in
the administration of the debtor’s estate, . . . and (6) whether the
employee’s services involve some degree of special knowledge or
skill, such that the employee can be considered a “professional” within
the ordinary meaning of the term.55

This test requires an examination of the type of duties to be performed by the
employee and whether any special skills or training is necessary to carry out
these duties.56 When applying the factors to the facts of a case, no one factor
should be dispositive, but the factors should be weighed against each other and
considered in toto.57 Such courts believe this combined approach is best because,
while the quantitative test focuses on the significance of the individual’s role to
the debtor proceeding and the qualitative test focuses on the amount of discretion
the individual has in accomplishing that role, the bottom line of both tests
involves an examination of the types of duties to be undertaken by the
individual.58 In the original application of this test, the debtor—in this case a
chapter 7 debtor—entered into a plan in which a third party, known as UDC,
would manage the purchase of new or used cars by customers with limited
access to traditional sources of credit—known to the company as “receivables,”
which constituted the bulk of the debtor’s estate.59 The trustee in the case
objected, contending that the debtor was employing a “professional” who also
had status as a creditor, thus precluding its involvement.60 Applying the sixfactor test above, the court held that UDC was a professional within the meaning
of § 327(a).61 The court starts by noting it is unclear whether UDC’s
employment pertained to the ordinary course of business of the debtor, or
whether it pertained to the administration of the debtor’s estate.62 The
employment of UDC was to assist the debtor with the management of the
receivables, which is the ordinary operation of the debtor.63 However, because
55
In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (citing In re First Merchants
Acceptance Corp., 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *8–10).
56
In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. at 173–74.
57
In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp., 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *10.
58
Id. at *7–8.
59
Id. at *10–11.
60
Id. at *5.
61
Id. at *9–10.
62
Id. at *10.
63
Id. at *10–11.
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the receivables were “so vital to the underlying estate,” UDC’s role in the
administration of the estate would be “quite significant.”64 Because the
receivables comprised the majority of the debtor’s estate and UDC would have
such authority in managing these assets, the court concluded that UDC’s role
was “akin to that of a professional, specialized collection agency.”65
Still other courts have different definitions for professional persons. The
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Delaware has established its own
definition for what constitutes a professional.66 This court holds that there are
two prongs in a determination of whether a person is a professional under
§ 327(a).67 To satisfy the first prong, one must be “a professional in a broad
sense[,]” and to satisfy the second prong, one must be a professional “engaged
to assist the trustee (or debtor in possession) in his or her duties . . . .”68 The court
settled on this approach because it felt that the test set out in Matter of Seatrain
Lines, Inc. addresses the second prong of § 327(a) but not the first prong—the
definition of professional.69 This test states that:
For the purposes of section 327(a), “professional person” is limited to
persons in those occupations which play a central role in the
administration of the debtor proceeding . . . . Court approval is required
for the retention of [a professional person, who is] intimately involved
in the administration of the debtor’s estate.70

According to this court, the four examples provided by the statute—attorneys,
accountants, appraisers, and auctioneers—make it apparent that the licensing of
the skill is not a prerequisite to being classified as a professional under § 327(a)
because appraisers and auctioneers need not be licensed.71
In one example of this two part analysis in action, the court had to consider
whether a debt collection agency qualified as a professional under § 327(a).72
The court noted that generally in debt collection there is an element of skill
involved, but that this skill is relatively easily mastered without significant
training or education.73 However, in this case the services of the debt collection

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at *11.
Id. at *13 (internal quotations omitted).
See In re Metro. Hosp., 119 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 916–17.
Id. at 917.
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agency were not only debt collection, but an extensive process that included
interviewing patients, reviewing their treatment records, determining which
patients might be Medicaid eligible, and submitting a timely application for
eligibility for that individual.74 Then—if eligibility were granted—the debt
collector would submit the debtor’s request for reimbursement and would be
responsible for insuring that the state was required to pay under the Medicaid
regulations.75 These services required a “specialized knowledge of the Medicaid
statute and regulations . . . the use of proper forms, strict compliance with the
time deadlines involved, the skills of a social worker in interviewing patients,
and perhaps even a knowledge of the administrative hearing process for
contesting the denial of MA eligibility”—all tasks undertaken only after
particularized training conducted or supervised by attorneys and experienced
non-attorneys.76 As a result, the court determined that the debt collector satisfied
the first prong of the § 327(a) test. However, the court then had to consider the
second prong—assisting the debtor in possession in the performance of duties
that “were required . . . by virtue of its fiduciary status as debtor in possession.”77
The court here expanded the scope of § 327(a), stating that it applied to far more
than just professionals assisting the trustee in the exercise of his duties that are
administrative tasks, but to all those who assist the chapter 11 debtor in
possession in operating its business “in a prudent, competent fashion . . . .”78
Courts have been widespread in their application of what constitutes a
professional. Categories of individuals who have been considered professionals
under the Bankruptcy Code include: brokers of real or personal property, leasing
agents for aircraft, architects, management consultants, financial consultants or
experts, investment banking firms, oil and gas consultants, oil and gas operators,
credit adjustment companies, collection agencies, public relations firms,
managers of commercial real estate, and engineering and industry management
consulting firms.79 Specifically regarding consulting agencies, court rulings are
varied. In one case, the New York court held that computer consultants did not
qualify as professionals because computer consultants are not professionals in
the same sense as doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers, architects, and
others, who are held to a higher standard of care under the law.80

74

Id. at 916.
Id. at 917.
76
Id. (internal citations omitted).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 918.
79
Rosemary Williams, Approval of employment of professional persons under 11 U.S.C.A. §. 327(a) and
Bankruptcy Rule 2014 nunc pro tunc, 133 A.L.R. Fed. 465 (1997).
80
Hosp. Comput. Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D.N.J. 1992).
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2. Various Tests for Who Qualifies as a Disinterested Person
Once it has been determined that an individual or entity is subject to § 327(a)
by virtue of being a professional person, that individual must consider whether
they are disinterested. Again, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is not clear on what is
the appropriate level of disinterestedness, although it does provide slightly more
guidance when compared to the Code’s treatment of professional persons. For
ordinary lawyers, there is an additional consideration in the constraints imposed
by the Rules of Professional Conduct, which are often looked to by courts for
guidance in determining whether there exists a conflict of interest––however,
this issue is not completely relevant here as we are considering professional
persons and their disinterested requirement.81
Section 327(a) states that the trustee may employ professional persons “that
do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are
disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the
trustee’s duties under this title.”82 The Code defines a disinterested person as a
person that:
[I]s not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider . . . and does
not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or
of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any
direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the
debtor, or for any other reason.83

Some courts interpret the disinterested standard strictly, disqualifying any
professional who has actual or potential conflicts of interest with the debtor,
while others only disqualify the professional if it holds interests that are
materially adverse to the estate.84
Again, the phrase “interest materially adverse to the estate” is not defined in
the Bankruptcy Code, but has been held to mean:
Holding or representing an interest adverse to the estate as possessing,
or serving as an attorney for a person possessing, either an economic
interest that would tend to lessen the value of the bankruptcy estate or
that would create either an actual or potential dispute in which the

81
Robert J. Landry & James R. Higdon, Ethical Considerations in Appointment and Compensation of an
Attorney for a Chapter 11 Debtor-in-Possession, 66 MISS. L.J. 355, 401 (1996).
82
11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2019).
83
11 U.S.C. §101(14) (2019).
84
Amer. Bankr. Inst., ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
4, 52 (2015).
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estate is a rival claimant . . . or . . . a predisposition under the
circumstances that render such a bias against the estate.85

The strict interpretation of the disinterested person standard holds that the catchall provision86 in 11 U.S.C. §101(14) is broad enough to include any “interest or
relationship that would even faintly color the independence and impartial
attitude required by the [C]ode . . . .”87 Courts using this interpretation have
adopted a “‘full panoply of events and elements’ or ‘totality of the
circumstances’ test to determine whether a particular conflict is materially
adverse to the estate[,]” with an emphasis on providing the judge in the case with
as much information as possible, facilitating a decision at his discretion.88 In
determining “whether the security interest coveted by counsel can be tolerated
under the particular circumstances[,]” this test considers:
the reasonableness of the arrangement and whether it was negotiated
in good faith, whether the security demanded was commensurate with
the predictable magnitude and value of the foreseeable services,
whether it was a needed means of ensuring the engagement of
competent counsel, and whether or not there are telltale signs of
overreaching. The nature and extent of the conflict must be assayed,
along with the likelihood that a potential conflict might turn into an
actual one. An effort should be made to measure the influence the
putative conflict may have in subsequent decision making. Perceptions
are important; how the matter likely appears to creditors and to other
parties in legitimate interest should be taken into account. There are
other salient factors as well: whether the existence of the security
interest threatens to hinder or to delay the effectuation of a plan,
whether it is (or could be perceived as) an impediment to
reorganization, and whether the fundamental fairness of the
proceedings might be unduly jeopardized (either by the actuality of the
arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it).89

Additionally, the Court notes that this list of factors is by no means exhaustive,
but that the most important fact is that the bankruptcy judge be given an
immediate opportunity to make an intelligent appraisal of the potential conflict
and to apply his “experience, common sense, and knowledge of the particular
proceeding” to bear on the issue of disinterestedness.90 This standard mandates
85

Landry & Higdon, supra note 81, at 364 (internal quotation omitted) (alterations omitted).
§101(14) (“the term ‘disinterested person’ means a person that—does not have an interest materially
adverse to the interest of the estate . . . for any . . . reason.”).
87
Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted).
88
Id.
89
In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 1987).
90
Id.
86
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a per se disqualification if there exists actual conflicts of interest, and allows the
district court discretion to dismiss parties with a potential conflict of interest.91
In contrast, other courts hold that the disinterested standard is less strict. In
determining whether there is a conflict, the court need not ask whether a conflict
exists, but “‘whether a potential conflict, or the perception of one renders the
lawyer’s interest materially adverse to the estate or the creditors.’”92 This same
Court expanded upon the adverse interest definition stating that an adverse
interest is the:
possession or the assertion [of] mutually exclusive claims to the same
economic interest, thus creating either an actual or potential dispute
between rival claimants as to which . . . of them the disputed right or
title to the interest in question attaches under valid and applicable law;
or (2) [the possession of] a predisposition or interest under
circumstances that render such a bias in favor of or against one of the
entities.93

The court further stated that the test is not subjective but it contemplates “‘an
objective screening for even the appearance of impropriety,’” and the court
noted that there can be a disqualifying conflict even absent proof of actual loss
or injury.94
In spite of formulating this less strict test, the First Circuit has stated that the
statutory requirements “serve [an] important policy of ensuring that all
professionals appointed pursuant to [§] 327(a) tender undivided loyalty and
provide untainted advice and assistance in furtherance of their fiduciary
responsibilities.”95 Further, “[§] 327(a) is designed to limit even appearances of
impropriety to the extent reasonably practicable,” therefore “doubt as to whether
a particular set of facts gives rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest normally
should be resolved in favor of disqualification.”96
3. Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) Disclosure Requirements
In addition to the requirements set out in § 327(a), professional parties
seeking employment in a bankruptcy proceeding must meet the requirements
91

See id. at 182–83.
Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Waters Edge Ltd. P’ship, 248 B.R. 668, 695 (D. Mass. 2000); In re Marvel
Entertainment Group, 140 F.3d 463, 476 (3d Cir. 1998).
93
Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 58 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted) (alteration in
original); Beal Bank, S.S.B., 248 B.R. at 695.
94
Beal Bank, S.S.B., 248 B.R. at 695 (internal citation omitted).
95
Rome, 19 F.3d at 58.
96
Id. at 60.
92
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established in Rule 2014(a). This rule states that professionals seeking
employment pursuant to § 327 must file an application that states, to the best of
the applicant’s knowledge, all of the person’s connections with the debtor,
creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants,
the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United
States trustee.97 There is a simple goal of this disclosure requirement: “to ensure
undivided loyalty to the estate and to preserve public confidence in the fairness
of the bankruptcy system.”98 “The disclosure requirements of Rule 2014 are
strictly applied and impose an independent duty upon the professional
applicant[,]” therefore “failure to comply . . . is a sanctionable violation.”99 Even
still, in applying this rule, courts are split on what constitutes a connection.
One court holds that “the professional must disclose all facts that bear on his
disinterestedness, and cannot usurp the court’s function by unilaterally choosing
which connections impact on his disinterestedness and which do not.”100 Courts
applying this holding believe that the disclosure requirements under Rule
2014(a) are broader than the rules governing disqualification under § 327(a), and
that an applicant must disclose all connections regardless of whether they are
sufficient to rise to the level of a disqualification under that section.
Other courts, however, have not been quite as strict in their application of
Rule 2014(a), holding that professionals “need not disclose every past or remote
connection with every party in interest,” but must “disclose those presently or
recently existing, whether they are business or personal in nature, which could
reasonably have an effect on the attorney’s judgment in the case.”101 The court
further stated that the “‘parties in interest’ includes entities holding ‘claims’
against the debtor and those whose pecuniary interests might be directly and
adversely affected by the proposed action.”102 In determining the sufficiency of
disclosures, potential employees should balance “the plain language of the rule’s
mandate that applicants disclose ‘all connections’” with a “common sense
analysis of what connections are reasonably defined as pertinent to the ultimate
question of disinterestedness” in order to lessen the burden of disclosures which
may deter competent professions from representing parties in bankruptcy

97

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) (2018).
In re Sundance Self Storage-El Dorado LP, 482 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
99
9 Collier on Bankruptcy P 2014.05 (16th ed. 2020).
100
Quarles & Brady LLP v. Maxfield (In re Jennings), 199 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal
citation omitted).
101
Drew v. Latimer, Biaggi, Rachi & Godreau (In re El Comandante Mgmt. Co., LLC), 395 B.R. 807,
814 (D.P.R. 2008) (emphasis added).
102
Id. at 817 (citing In re Savage Indus., 43 F.3d 714, 720 (1st Cir. 1994)).
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cases.103 Indeed, there is an argument that the only connections that must be
disclosed under Rule 2014 are relations that a professional had with entities that
are parties in interest in the instant case, by virtue of parallel involvement in
other cases.104 Some courts have even stated that the only connections requiring
disclosure are fee sharing arrangements that might affect the court’s decision to
approve employment.105
4. Penalties for Violation of 11 U.S.C. § 327
Section 328(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the penalties imposed on
professionals that violate the disinterested standard set out in § 327. This section
states that:
[T]he court may deny allowance of compensation for services and
reimbursement of expenses of a professional person employed under
section 327 . . . if, at any time during such professional person’s
employment . . . such professional person is not a disinterested person,
or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate
with respect to the matter on which such professional person is
employed.106

In applying this section of the Code, the remedies available to courts include
“disqualification and the denial or disgorgement of all fees.”107
5. Jay Alix v. McKinsey and the Application of the Established Tests
The above requirements serve as the underlying issue in Alix v. McKinsey &
Co. Alix is the founder of AlixPartners, a major consulting firm that has a
significant presence in the bankruptcy area, which Alix alleges McKinsey
entered and stole business using its illegal policies.109 Alix brought suit against
McKinsey RTS—the restructuring arm of McKinsey’s business; McKinsey &
Co.—who owns and controls McKinsey RTS; and various McKinsey senior
executives and partners, including Dominic Barton—managing partner of
McKinsey & Co., Kevin Carmody—partner and senior executive of McKinsey
RTS, Jon Garcia—senior partner and founding executive of McKinsey RTS,
108

103

In re FiberMark, Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4029, at *38 (Bankr. D. Vt.).
Id. at *29.
105
9 Collier on Bankruptcy, P2014.05 (16th ed. 2020); see In re Arlan’s Dept. Stores, Inc. 615 F.2d 925,
932 (2d Cir. 1979).
106
11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (2019).
107
Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1994).
108
See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 5–6.
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See id. at 1.
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Seth Goldstrom, Alison Proshan—associate general counsel for McKinsey, and
Robert Sternfels.110
The lawsuit is the latest in a string of confrontations and lawsuits between
McKinsey and its employees, and Alix. According to McKinsey’s motion to
dismiss, Alix began confronting McKinsey leaders about its Rule 2014(a)
disclosures, which he deemed to be non-compliant and illegal.111 Over the
course of several years, Alix confronted Dominic Barton—McKinsey’s
managing partner—eleven times, all initiated by Alix, including three in-person
meetings.112 Throughout these meetings, Alix attempted to convince Barton that
McKinsey RTS was not compliant with Rule 2014(a)’s requirements, however
McKinsey asserts that it was compliant, as affirmed by multiple bankruptcy
courts—but that Alix’s “uniquely personal interpretation” of Rule 2014(a) is
incorrect.113
After these initial encounters, Alix upped his efforts. He formed an LLC—
Mar-Bow Value Partners, LLC, whose sole function was to purchase a creditor
claim for “pennies on the dollar” in the Alpha Natural Resources bankruptcy.114
Through this company, Alix began complaining to the U.S. Trustee regarding
McKinsey’s disclosures in the course—disclosures which had already been
considered and allowed by the bankruptcy judge in that case and in which the
complaints were not joined by any other creditor involved in the case.115
Following these complaints, the U.S. Trustee filed a motion to compel
McKinsey to make additional disclosures beyond its normal practices, which
consisted of merely describing the parties the firm had connections with, rather
than specifically naming the companies.116 McKinsey complied, and submitted
a supplemental disclosure that satisfied the U.S. Trustee’s standards—with the
court even stating that it was “‘completely satisfied that there is not any type of
disinterested problem with McKinsey going forward’ and that it was ‘very
satisfied with the information’” McKinsey submitted.117
Alix, however, was not satisfied. He filed a motion to clarify and even
challenged the debtor’s entire plan of reorganization, an action which left the
110

See id. at 98–100.
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 12, Jay Alix v. McKinsey, 404 F. Supp. 3d 827 (S.D.N.Y. July 30,
2018) (No. 18-cv-04141).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 13.
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Id.
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Id. at 12.
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Id. at 14.
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court “bewildered” and “confused[,]” resulting in the court rejecting both of
Alix’s challenges.118 These rejections still did not deter Alix—he next moved to
stay the implementation of the plan—an action which was again rejected by the
court.119 Finally, Alix continued to appeal the decision up to the district court in
Mar-Bow Value Partners, LLC v. McKinsey Recovery & Transformation
Services US, LLC.120 Recently, more activity has taken place. In an incredibly
rare move, the judge in the Alpha Natural Resources bankruptcy case reopened
the case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b), which provides that “[a] case may be
reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to
accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.”121 At the time of reopening the
case, the judge made no conclusions about McKinsey’s alleged misconduct, but
that the continuation of hearings will allow the court to determine whether
McKinsey’s actions undermined the fundamental fairness of the bankruptcy
proceedings.122
In the complaint, Alix states that McKinsey’s racketeering activity was
“calculated to harm AP,” and that McKinsey knew it would be disqualified from
employment under § 327 due to its extensive roster of clients and alumni
connections.123 In its complaint, Alix asserts that when considering whether a
professional is disinterested, bankruptcy courts consider multiple factors,
including:
[1] whether the professional possesses or asserts for a client any
economic interest that would tend to lessen the value of the bankruptcy
estate or create either an actual or potential dispute in which the estate
would be a rival claimant; [2] whether the professional possesses a
predisposition under the circumstances to be biased against the estate;
[3] whether the professional has some interest or relationship that
would even faintly color the independence and impartial attitude
required by the Code; [4] whether it is likely that the professional will
be placed in a position permitting it to favor one interest over an
impermissibly conflicting interest; [5] whether the professional is
serving the debtors with undivided loyalty and providing untainted
advice and assistance; and [6] the likelihood that a potential conflict

118

Id. (alterations omitted).
Id. at 12.
120
Mar-Bow Value Partners, LLC v. McKinsey Recovery & Transformation Servs. US, LLC, 578 B.R.
325 (E.D. Va. 2017).
121
11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2019).
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Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6.
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Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2.
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might turn into an actual or the influence that a conflict might have on
the professional’s decision making.124

The complaint asserts that McKinsey’s connections are extensive, citing
McKinsey’s website which states that McKinsey offers consulting services in
everything from advanced electronics to paper and forest products industries.125
Indeed, it is logical that McKinsey will have numerous potential connections
to almost any company, considering its status as the biggest of the “Big Three”
consulting firms and the fact that over a quarter of its alumni have proceeded to
found their own businesses upon leaving McKinsey, with nearly 400 of them
leading $1 billion enterprises worldwide,126 a feat that earns McKinsey the honor
of having more alumni currently serving as Fortune 500 CEOs than any other
company.127 As a result of the connections, McKinsey cannot perform its
duties—such as assisting the debtors in managing the chapter 11 bankruptcy
process, including managing outside stakeholders—because, among the outside
stakeholders McKinsey is charged with managing, are McKinsey’s own
clients.128
According to the complaint, in multiple cases McKinsey has failed to
disclose a single connection, either throughout the case or, at a minimum, prior
to confirmation of chapter 11 plans.129 Allegedly, over a thirteen year period,
McKinsey accepted eight restructuring cases in which they failed to comply with
the disclosure requirements of § 327(a) and Rule 2014(a).130 For example, in the
Hayes bankruptcy case, McKinsey did not name a single connection to any
interested parties, despite filing three separate affidavits.131 Similarly, McKinsey
filed two affidavits in the UAL bankruptcy case—the first of which named zero
connections to any interested parties in the case, and the second of which—filed
after McKinsey’s employment had already been approved by the bankruptcy

124

Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 15–16.
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 18.
126
McKinsey & Company, VAULT (2020), https://www.vault.com/company-profiles/managementstrategy/mckinsey-company.
127
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 15.
128
Id. at 90.
129
See id. at 29.
130
See Emiko Bd. v. AMF Bowling Worldwide, Inc. (In re AMF Bowling Worldwide, Inc.), 520 B.R.
185 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014); In re Edison Mission Energy, 502 B.R. 830 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013); In re AMR
Corp., 478 B.R. 599 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Harry & David Holdings, Inc., No. 11-BR-10884 (Bankr. D.
Del. Mar. 28, 2011); In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Mirant Corp., 354
B.R. 113 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Hayes Lemmerz Int’l, Inc., 340 B.R. 461 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); In re
UAL Corp., 307 B.R. 80 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
131
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 22.
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court—named eleven interested parties that were current McKinsey clients. This
is notable considering that some of the parties named in the UAL case—
JPMorgan Chase and Bank One Corporation and The Boeing Company—were
also parties in the Hayes case, where McKinsey did not name the very same
companies it later stated as interested parties to which it had connections.132
McKinsey, however, believes that this lack of disclosure is a feature of its
business, rather than wrongdoing, telling bankruptcy courts that it cannot
disclose connections due to “its responsibility to maintain strict client
confidentiality.”133
In his prayer for relief, Jay Alix requests, among other things, that McKinsey
must disgorge all moneys received as a result of their illegal activities, per
§ 328(c).134 Were the court to grant this request, the consequences would be
enormous. According to Alix’s complaint, McKinsey has received tens of
millions in bankruptcy fees that it would not have otherwise earned if it had to
disclose its connections or were disqualified due to these connections.135
Through its “racketeering scheme,” McKinsey has allegedly earned $101
million in the form of bankruptcy consulting fees.136 Were the allegations in
Alix’s complaint proved, McKinsey would have to pay huge fines as required
under convictions for bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152(2),
152(3), and 152(6); mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; wire fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503(a); witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b) and 1512(c);
unlawful monetary transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957; and
inducement to interstate or foreign travel in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, in
addition to the fees McKinsey would owe due to disgorgement under 11 U.S.C.
§ 328(c).137
Alix states that damages to AlixPartners (AP) include, but are not limited to,
fees from bankruptcy consulting engagements AP would have earned in the
absence of McKinsey’s unlawful conduct, other lost business opportunities (i.e.,
pre- and post-bankruptcy work AlixPartners would have received had it been
able to form a relationship with debtor companies), and attorneys’ fees and
costs—including the attorneys’ fees and costs associated with exposing and

132
133
134
135
136
137

Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 22–23.
Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6.
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 144.
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2.
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 1341, 1343, 1503, 1512, 1956, 1957, 2314 (2018); 11 U.S.C. § 328 (2019).
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litigating the criminal activities engaged in by McKinsey.138 Additionally, were
the allegations to be proved true, Alix would be entitled to recover treble
damages, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), which provides that “any person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962 of this
chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”139
Alix alleges that McKinsey formed McKinsey RTS— the restructuring
portion of McKinsey’s business—“for the purpose of facilitating, committing,
perpetuating, and concealing the fraudulent and other criminal conduct alleged
herein with the aim of unlawfully depriving AP of bankruptcy consulting
engagements it otherwise would have obtained.”140 Additionally, Alix states that
McKinsey RTS is distinct from McKinsey & Co.’s other entities not for any
legitimate reasons, but because McKinsey hoped to “add a veneer of
indirectness” and use McKinsey RTS as a pretext for withholding the numerous
connections McKinsey has to debtors and bankruptcy proceeding participants,
as well as to conduct the racketeering from a separate legal entity, walling off
the illegal activities from the rest of McKinsey’s business operations.141
McKinsey, meanwhile, states that its alleged connections to various companies
are not a legitimate issue because the companies are customers of McKinsey’s
main consulting organization or investments of McKinsey’s investment arm,
MIO Partners, Inc., which are separate entities from McKinsey RTS, which is
“intentionally separate” and “follows policies designed to avoid conflicts of
interest . . . .”142
In response to this lawsuit, McKinsey stated that the company’s disclosure
met all the legal requirements and described Alix’s suit as “baseless and anticompetitive litigation . . . .”143 Additionally, McKinsey filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that Alix’s complaint is deficient in numerous respects.144
In spite of McKinsey’s claims and several setbacks in court, Alix has
continued his litigation against McKinsey, and has also attracted the interest of
the United States trustee and the United States Attorney’s Office in Manhattan.
138

Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 124.
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2018).
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The United States trustee stated that “McKinsey failed to satisfy its obligations
under bankruptcy law and demonstrated a lack of candor with the court and
USTP,” and entered into a $15 million settlement agreement, which McKinsey
states was not an admittance of wrongdoing but “provided additional clarity for
the filing of future disclosures.”145 The United States Attorney’s Office,
meanwhile, was reportedly investigating whether McKinsey used its influence
over bankruptcy clients to steer assets to itself and its clients over competing
creditors.146 Alix’s litigation against McKinsey has continued, most recently in
the Westmoreland Coal Co. bankruptcy, where Alix again objects to limited
disclosures by McKinsey—a position that is supported by the United States
Justice Department, who objected to McKinsey’s work in the Westmoreland
case.147 This case will be especially important, as it is in one of the main
bankruptcy venues in the country, Houston, Texas, and thus could serve to create
a firm precedent for how courts should treat such disclosure requirements in the
future. The judge in charge of the case appears to agree, promising a definitive
ruling on disclosure requirements at the end of the trial, and stating that he does
not “want to ever do this again.”148 While the litigation has been delayed due to
the coronavirus pandemic, once it resumes the court has an opportunity to
resolve this definitional issue once and for all.
B. Analysis
Considering the various standards set out in different courts, this Comment
suggests a consistent standard should be applied to what constitutes a
professional person and disinterested person under § 327(a), what the adequate
level of disclosures is under Rule 2014(a), and recommends, in part, how the
court should resolve the issues it is faced with in Alix v. McKinsey & Co. In
establishing a consistent standard, the court should: 1) adopt the six-part test for
determining a professional set out by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware in In re American Tissue, Inc.;149 2) adopt the strict definition of
disinterested as set out by the Fourth Circuit in In re Martin;150 3) require an
extensive level of disclosures similar to the amount set forth by the standard

145

Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6 (internal quotations omitted).
Walsh, supra note 143.
147
Tom Corrigan, McKinsey Foe Alleges ‘Game of Hide and Seek’ at Bankruptcy Trial, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mckinsey-foe-alleges-game-of-hide-and-seek-at-bankruptcy-trial11580934518.
148
Id.
149
See supra Section A1.
150
See supra Section A2.
146
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established in In re Jennings by the Eleventh Circuit;151 and 4) rule for Jay Alix
in his case against McKinsey & Co. While several of these tests include multifactor balancing tests and reasonability standards that might seem unclear at
first, the abundance of case law laying the framework for interpreting these tests
will be sufficient to create a clear standard. Additionally, perhaps more
important than selecting a clear standard with bright-line rules guiding
application, is the adoption of consistent tests across all jurisdictions, in order to
prevent forum shopping and confusion in the bankruptcy theater. In selecting
these standards and tests, it is important to keep in mind the reasons § 327(a)
and Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) were adopted: “to ensure undivided loyalty to the
estate and to preserve public confidence in the fairness of the bankruptcy
system[,]”152 as well as the two fundamental goals of bankruptcy: “a fresh start
for the debtor and equal treatment of creditors.”153
1. A Broad Definition of Professional Persons Under § 327(a)
In In re Am. Tissue, Inc., the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware
established a six-factor test to consult when confronted with the issue of whether
or not an individual or entity is a professional.154 The six factors are:
(1) whether the employee controls, manages, administers, invests,
purchases or sells assets that are significant to the debtor’s
reorganization; (2) whether the employee is involved in negotiating
the terms of a Plan of Reorganization; (3) whether the employment is
directly related to the type of work carried out by the debtor or to the
routine maintenance of the debtor’s business operations; (4) whether
the employee is given discretion or autonomy to exercise his or her
own professional judgment in some part of the administration of the
debtor’s estate; (5) the extent of the employee’s involvement in the
administration of the debtor’s estate; and (6) whether the employee’s
services involve some degree of special knowledge or skill, such that
the employee can be considered a “professional” within the ordinary
meaning of the term.155

No single factor is dispositive, but the factors should be weighed against each
other and considered in total.156 This test is, in part, inspired by the qualitative

151
152
153
154
155

See supra Section A3.
In re Sundance Self Storage-El Dorado LP, 482 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120, 127 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).
See In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. 169 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).
Id. at 173 (citing In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp., 1997. Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *3 (D. Del.

1997)).
156

Id. (citing In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp., 1997. Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *3).
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and quantitative tests discussed previously,157 but presents an expansive
definition inclusive of the important elements of each test that encompasses a
broad range of individuals under the term “professional.”
Courts should adopt this rule because it provides for a broad definition of
professional that is at the discretion of the judge—an experienced bankruptcy
expert knowledgeable about the topic and familiar with the rationales behind the
statutory provisions in bankruptcy. However, this may change as cases are
appealed up the ladder.158 A multi-factored balancing test is effective for three
reasons: (1) it is simple; (2) it is descriptive; and (3) it is just.159 Again, in
adopting standards, the bankruptcy court must keep in mind its general goals—
a fresh start for the debtor and equal treatment of creditors. The multi-factored
balancing test more accurately satisfies these general goals—particularly the
equal treatment of creditors provision.
Ensuring that the debtor is adequately represented by educated professionals
who have been properly vetted by the bankruptcy court and who are required to
go through the disclosures processes required by Rule 2014(a) and § 327(a)
provides for a more effective, fair, and profitable bankruptcy experience for all
parties, but most importantly, for creditors, by making for a robust, transparent
bankruptcy process. Additionally, this combined approach is best because it
offers the advantage of considering all aspects of the alleged professional’s
involvement in the bankruptcy proceeding. In contrast, the quantitative test from
In re Seatrain Lines, Inc. merely focuses on the significance of the individual’s
role to the debtor proceeding,160 while the qualitative test from In re Fretheim
merely focuses on the amount of discretion the individual has in accomplishing
that role.161
When adopting tests regarding specific provisions, the bankruptcy court
must also consider the specific goals of those provisions, in this case “to ensure
undivided loyalty to the estate and to preserve public confidence in the fairness
157

See supra Section A(3)(b).
See Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special about Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 772, 779–80 (1990).
Although a balancing test is perhaps even more useful for judges relatively inexperienced with bankruptcy, such
as those at the appellate levels, according to Judge Frank Easterbrook, “what happens when you turn a generalist
loose in a complex world? An ignorant or unwise judge will be unaware of his limits and is apt to do something
foolish. A sophisticated judge understands that he is not knowledgeable and so tries to limit the potential damage.
How is this done? By and large, it is done by constructing ‘five-part balancing tests.’ Not only judges but also
the leaders of the bar find this approach congenial. The American Law Institute’s Restatements teem with multifactor approaches.” Id.
159
See Patrick McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 622 (1988).
160
See In re Seatrain Lines, Inc., 13 B.R. 980, 981 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
161
See In re Fretheim, 102 B.R. 298, 299 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
158
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of the bankruptcy system.”162 This multi-factor balancing test is most effective
in accomplishing these goals. It considers all aspects of how the professional
seeking employment will be assisting in the bankruptcy process. This allows the
judge to make an effective determination of (1) whether the individual/entity
should properly be considered a professional, and (2) whether it is appropriate
for the debtor in possession or trustee to hire such a professional to assist in the
bankruptcy process. The broad definition also promotes the goal of ensuring
undivided loyalty to the estate because it encompasses more professionals, who
will thus fall under the § 327(a) requirements—resulting in disclosures under
Rule 2014(a) and the disqualification requirements from § 327(a) itself being
applied to the professional, providing for a more complete, transparent
bankruptcy process. While the application of balancing tests is not always
entirely consistent, the presence of six clear factors to guide a group of
experienced professionals such as the judges sitting on the bankruptcy court
should be sufficient to guide preliminary decisions by entities involved in the
bankruptcy process, such as AlixPartners and McKinsey, in the future.
Additionally, this definition provides an extensive list of what bankruptcy judges
should consider. While there is still some discretion available to judges, there
are at least far more guidelines than some of the other formulations, such as
whether the individual is “a professional in a broad sense.”163
2. Disinterested Standard Under § 327(a)
Section 327(a) of the Code states that the trustee “may employ one or more
attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons,
that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are
disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the
trustee’s duties under . . . 11 U.S.C. § 101.”164 Regarding what qualifies as
disinterested under § 327(a), the court should again use a strict standard, in this
case the one previously adopted by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,165 which states
that the catch-all provision in § 101(14)166 is broad enough to include any
“interest or relationship that would even faintly color the independence and
impartial attitude required by the code.”167 This test requires the application of

162

In re Sundance Self Storage-El Dorado LP, 482 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
In re Metro. Hosp., 119 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
164
11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2019).
165
See Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2008); see also In re
Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 1987).
166
See generally 11 U.S.C. §101(14) (2019) (“the term ‘disinterested person’ means a person that—does
not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate . . . for any . . . reason”).
167
In re AFI Holding, Inc., 530 F.3d at 838.
163
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a “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether a particular conflict
is materially adverse to the state.168 Two aspects of this totality of the
circumstances test are worth paying special note to. First, “[p]erceptions are
important; how the matter likely appears to creditors and to other parties in
legitimate interest should be taken into account.”169 Second, “whether the
fundamental fairness of the proceedings might be unduly jeopardized (either by
the actuality of the arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it).”170
The inclusion of these two factors in the test is important, because they mirror
the second reason for the disclosure requirements under Rule 2014(a): “to
preserve public confidence in the fairness of the bankruptcy system.”171
This test is most effective because it more accurately captures the two goals
for the required disclosures and disinterested standard.172 Additionally, the less
strict standard, which states that the court need not ask whether a conflict exists,
but “whether a potential conflict, or the perception of one renders the lawyer’s
interest materially adverse to the estate or to creditors,”173 is contradictory to the
standards the courts applying it seek to uphold. In applying this test, the First
Circuit has stated that the statutory requirements “serve an important policy of
ensuring that all professionals appointed pursuant to [§] 327(a) tender undivided
loyalty and provide untainted advice and assistance in furtherance of their
fiduciary responsibilities.”174 The court also stated that “[§] 327(a) is designed
to limit even appearances of impropriety to the extent reasonable
practicable. . . .”175 Surely a stricter test would better serve the goal of limiting
“even appearances of impropriety” by requiring the professional seeking
168
See In re Martin, 817 F.2d at 182 (In determining whether the security interest coveted by counsel can
be tolerated under the particular circumstances, the test considers: “the reasonableness of the arrangement and
whether it was negotiated in good faith, whether the security demanded was commensurate with the predictable
magnitude and value of the foreseeable services, whether it was a needed means of ensuring the engagement of
competent counsel, and whether or not there are telltale signs of overreaching. The nature and extent of the
conflict must be assayed, along with the likelihood that a potential conflict might turn into an actual one. An
effort should be made to measure the influence the putative conflict may have in subsequent decision making.
Perceptions are important; how the matter likely appears to creditors and to other parties in legitimate interest
should be taken into account. There are other salient factors as well: whether the existence of the security interest
threatens to hinder or to delay the effectuation of a plan, whether it is (or could be perceived as) an impediment
to reorganization, and whether the fundamental fairness of the proceedings might be unduly jeopardized (either
by the actuality of the arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it).”).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
In re Sundance Self Storage-El Dorado LP, 482 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
172
See id. at 624–25 (“To ensure undivided loyalty to the estate and to preserve public confidence in the
fairness of the bankruptcy system.”).
173
In re Martin, 817 F.2d at 182.
174
Rome v. Braunstein, 19 F.3d 54, 58–60 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
175
Id. at 60.
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employment to submit connections to the court, who then decides whether, in
totality, there is a conflict of interest.176
3. Extensive Disclosures Required Under Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a)
Rule 2014(a) states that to be employed as a professional, an application that
details “all of the person’s connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party
in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee,
or any person employed in the office of the United States trustee” must be
filed.177 This application must be “accompanied by a verified statement of the
person to be employed setting forth the person’s connections with the debtor,
creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants,
the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United
States trustee.”178 When seeking employment, courts should require
professionals to meet the Rule 2014(a) disclosure requirement set out by the
Eleventh Circuit in In re Jennings, which sets forth a strict requirement that the
professional seeking employment “must disclose all facts that bear on his
disinterestedness, and cannot usurp the court’s function by unilaterally choosing
which connections impact on his disinterestedness and which do not.”179 This
standard is quite broad, as courts applying this holding reason that the disclosure
requirements set forth in Rule 2014(a) are broader than the rules governing
disqualification, and that, to satisfy these rules, a professional seeking
employment must disclose all connections, regardless of whether they believe
they are sufficient to rise to the level necessitating disqualification under
§ 327(a).
This test is much more strict than other formulations, which state that
professionals seeking employment “need not disclose every past or remote
connection with every party in interest . . . [but] . . . must disclose those presently
or recently existing, whether they are of business or personal in nature, which
could reasonably have an effect on the attorney’s judgment in the case.”180 This
requirement to “disclose all facts that bear on his disinterestedness,” rather than
relying on a reasonableness standard will certainly be more costly and result in
lengthier bankruptcy proceedings than adoption of a reasonableness standard, as

176

Id.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) (2018).
178
Id.
179
Quarles & Brady LLP v. Maxfield (In re Jennings), 199 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting
In re Gulf Coast Orthopedic Ctr., 265 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).
180
Drew v. Latimer, Biaggi, Rachi & Godreau (In re El Comandante Mgmt. Co., LLC), 395 B.R. 807,
814 (D.P.R. 2008) (quoting In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 239 B.R. 635, 647 (1st Cir. 1999)).
177
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the judge must consider all possible connections, rather than only those that the
professional deems relevant. However, there are two benefits to the adoption of
this strict standard. First, a stricter standard is more in line with the goal of Rule
2014(a): “to ensure undivided loyalty to the estate and to preserve public
confidence in the fairness of the bankruptcy system.”181 Certainly a system
which provides the bankruptcy court with all the information available will
better provide undivided loyalty to the estate, as well as to preserve confidence
in the fairness of the system, than a test which gives discretion to professionals
seeking employment as to whether they believe a connection might impact their
decision-making during the bankruptcy process. Secondly, a reasonableness
standard is harder to apply and will result in inconsistencies in what constitutes
reasonable between jurisdictions—precisely the problem the courts are currently
facing in the absence of a common, easily applicable standard.
4. Alix v. McKinsey & Co. and the Application of Strict Standards
Regarding Jay Alix’s suit versus McKinsey, it must first be determined
whether McKinsey is a professional under § 327(a), using the test discussed
above.182 If the answer to this question is yes, it raises the question of whether
McKinsey qualifies as disinterested under § 327(a), again using the test
discussed above.183 And finally, there is the question of whether McKinsey’s
disclosures meet the requirements discussed above.184 While Alix has faced
difficulties in obtaining standing in his various proceedings against McKinsey,
the underlying issues are still relevant and worthy of discussion.185
a. McKinsey’s Status as a Professional
Using the definition from the test set out in In re Am. Tissue, Inc., McKinsey
is clearly a professional according to the Bankruptcy Code. Under this test, the
court considers the following six factors:
(1) whether the employee controls, manages, administers, invests,
purchases or sells assets that are significant to the debtor’s
reorganization; (2) whether the employee is involved in negotiating

181

In re Sundance Self Storage-El Dorado LP, 482 B.R. 613, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (emphasis

added).
182

See supra Section B1.
See supra Section B2.
184
See supra Section B3.
185
See Tom Corrigan, McKinsey Dodges Lawsuit Targeting Its Bankruptcy Disclosures, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mckinsey-dodges-lawsuit-targeting-its-bankruptcy-disclosures11566255695).
183
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the terms of a Plan of Reorganization; (3) whether the employment is
directly related to the type of work carried out by the debtor or to the
routine maintenance of the debtor’s business operations; (4) whether
the employee is given discretion or autonomy to exercise his or her
own professional judgment in some part of the administration of the
debtor’s estate . . .; (5) the extent of the employee’s involvement in the
administration of the debtor’s estate . . .; and (6) whether the
employee’s services involve some degree of special knowledge or
skill, such that the employee can be considered a “professional” within
the ordinary meaning of the term.186

While no single factor from this test is dispositive, and the circumstances should
be considered in toto, McKinsey satisfies several of them.187
According to a report by the Wall Street Journal, McKinsey’s role in the
bankruptcy process went so far as to devise the reorganization plan for the
companies it services,188 while Alix’s complaint states that McKinsey “secured”
confirmation of the plan of reorganization.189 Additionally, McKinsey’s website
advertises its services as including the creation of “a blueprint for successful
long-term recovery of the business” and, in the case of judicially driven or
formal restructurings, McKinsey offers “comprehensive support[.]”190 Based on
this information, it is clear that McKinsey, at a minimum, satisfies factor two as
it is involved in formulating and negotiating the terms of a plan of
reorganization. While no one factor is dispositive, satisfying factor two is strong
evidence that McKinsey is a professional under the In re Am. Tissue, Inc. sixpart test.
b. McKinsey’s Violation of the Disinterested Standard from Section
327(a)
Because McKinsey qualifies as a professional, it is subject to the
disinterested standard as set forth in § 327(a), which provides that anyone may
be employed provided that they are:

186
In re Am. Tissue, Inc., 331 B.R. 169, 173 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (citing In re First Merchants
Acceptance Corp., 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2245, at *3 (D. Del. 1997)).
187
See generally Alix v. McKinsey & Co., 404 F. Supp. 3d 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting motion to
dismiss RICO claim because plaintiff did not satisfy RICO’s proximate cause standard). As readily determinable
by information at hand as of Jan. 12, 2019. More information will become available as the case against McKinsey
proceeds.
188
See Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6.
189
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 19.
190
Corporate Restructuring and Turnarounds, MCKINSEY & CO., https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/rts/how-we-help-clients/corporate-restructuring-and-turnarounds.
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[N]ot a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider . . . [and] does
not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or
of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any
direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the
debtor, or for any other reason.191

The proper test is that set forth in Dye v. Brown, which has already been adopted
by both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,192 and articulates that the catch-all
provision in § 101(14)193 is “broad enough to include . . . [any] interest or
relationship that ‘would even faintly color the independence and impartial
attitude required by the code.’”194 This test requires the application of a totality
of the circumstances test to determine whether a particular conflict is materially
adverse to the state.195 One aspect of this totality of the circumstances test is
worth paying special note to: “perceptions are important; how the matter likely
appears to creditors and to other parties in legitimate interest should be taken
into account.”196 Additionally, other salient factors include “whether the
fundamental fairness of the proceedings might be unduly jeopardized (either by
the actuality of the arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it).”197
While an individual factor by itself is not dispositive under this test, these factors
are of particular importance considering the publicity that has been brought to
Alix’s case against McKinsey, as well as the various bankruptcies McKinsey
has been involved in, as a result of the Wall Street Journal’s various exposés
against McKinsey.

191

11 U.S.C. §101(14) (2019).
See Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Martin, 817 F.2d
175, 182 (4th Cir. 1987).
193
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (“The term ‘disinterested person’ means a person that—does not have an
interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate . . . for any . . . reason.”).
194
Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re AFI Holding,
Inc., 355 B.R. 139, 149 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006)).
195
See In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 1987) (The test considers: “the reasonableness of the
arrangement and whether it was negotiated in good faith, whether the security demanded was commensurate
with the predictable magnitude and value of the foreseeable services, whether it was a needed means of ensuring
the engagement of competent counsel, and whether or not there are telltale signs of overreaching. The nature
and extent of the conflict must be assayed, along with the likelihood that a potential conflict might turn into an
actual one. An effort should be made to measure the influence the putative conflict may have in subsequent
decision making. Perceptions are important; how the matter likely appears to creditors and to other parties in
legitimate interest should be taken into account. There are other salient factors as well: whether the existence of
the security interest threatens to hinder or to delay the effectuation of a plan, whether it is (or could be perceived
as) an impediment to reorganization, and whether the fundamental fairness of the proceedings might be unduly
jeopardized (either by the actuality of the arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it).”).
196
Id.
197
Id.
192
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Here, it is likely that McKinsey would not be considered disinterested under
the totality of the circumstances test. When determining “whether the security
interest coveted by counsel can be tolerated under the particular circumstances,”
salient factors include:
whether the existence of the security interest threatens to hinder or to
delay the effectuation of a plan, whether it is (or could be perceived
as) an impediment to reorganization, and whether the fundamental
fairness of the proceedings might be unduly jeopardized (either by the
actuality of the arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of
it).198

While there has yet to be a complaint by one of the participants in a bankruptcy
managed by McKinsey, the complaints by Alix, and others, have gained much
notoriety, including being the subject of a multi-page exposé in the Wall Street
Journal.199 Indeed, the allegations featured in the Wall Street Journal exposé
resulted in the bankruptcy judge in charge of the Alpha Natural Resources
bankruptcy reopening the case to look into these allegations, which he called the
“most serious” the judge had ever seen—that McKinsey had a major investment
in a hedge fund run by Whitebox Advisors, LLC, an Alpha Natural Resources
creditor who received the bankrupt company’s most valuable asset.200 This suit
was later dismissed due to Alix not having standing to bring the case,201 but the
point remains: this notoriety is not acceptable, particularly under the totality of
the circumstances test set forth in Dye v. Brown—it serves to undermine the
fundamental fairness of the bankruptcy proceedings. Allowing misconduct of
the sort Alix is alleging McKinsey engaged in will only serve to lessen public
confidence in the effectiveness and fairness of the bankruptcy system and is
contrary to the principles that form the basis of the bankruptcy system.
One factor in particular: “whether the fundamental fairness of the
proceedings might by unduly jeopardized (either by the actuality of the
arrangement or by the reasonable public perception of it)” is especially troubling
when considering Alix’s case against McKinsey.202 While the full details of what
actually transpired will be revealed in the trial, at a minimum the abundance of
Wall Street Journal reports and attention that this case has received, the fact that
198

In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 1987).
See Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 6.
200
Tom Corrigan & Gretchen Morgenson, Judge Reopens Bankruptcy Case, Citing Allegations McKinsey
Hid Investments, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-reopens-bankruptcy-caseciting-allegations-mckinsey-hid-investments-11547077920).
201
Tom Corrigan, Judge Reins in Jay Alix’s Bankruptcy Brawl with McKinsey, WALL ST. J. (May 20,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-reins-in-jay-alixs-bankruptcy-brawl-with-mckinsey-11558380704.
202
In re Martin, 817 F.2d at 182.
199
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the United States trustee has issued condemnations of McKinsey, as well as the
fact that the judge in the Alpha Natural Resources case has reopened the case in
light of further revelations of McKinsey’s lack of disclosures, all point to the
fact that the proceedings McKinsey has involved in are lacking fundamental
fairness—if not in reality, then certainly in the “reasonable public perception of
it.”203 Additionally, it is clear that in most, if not all of the bankruptcy cases
listed in Alix’s complaint, the bankruptcy judge was not given an immediate
opportunity to make an intelligent appraisal of the potential conflict and to apply
his “experience, common sense, and knowledge of the particular proceeding” to
bear on the issue of disinterestedness—a requirement that courts applying this
test consider to be the most important factor in the § 327(a) disclosure
requirements.204
c. McKinsey’s Failure to Satisfy Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a) Disclosures
Regarding the Rule 2014(a) disclosures, McKinsey responds that its
disclosures were “robust and comprehensive[,]” stating that in Alix’s complaint
Alix did not append any of the allegedly deficient disclosures and quickly
skipped past their actual content in the complaint.205 Accordingly, across the
thirteen bankruptcy cases implicated in the suit, McKinsey submitted thirty-nine
declarations totaling more than 498 pages that disclosed McKinsey’s
connections to interested parties and set forth the process through which
McKinsey identified these connections.206
However, the above recommended disclosure requirements207 state that
bankruptcy professionals must “disclose all facts that bear on his
disinterestedness, and cannot usurp the court’s function by unilaterally choosing
which connections impact on his disinterestedness and which do not.”208 Under
other, less strict formulations, McKinsey might be considered to have satisfied
its disclosure requirements. However, because the proper disinterested standard
is the strict test set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in In re Jennings, McKinsey
has not satisfied its obligation under Rule 2014(a).
In reviewing past cases mentioned in Alix’s brief, it is clear that McKinsey
has not disclosed all facts that bear on its disinterestedness. In multiple cases,

203
204
205
206
207
208

Id.
Id.; see Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1.
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, supra note 111, at 9.
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 111, at 9.
See supra Section A3.
Quarles & Brady LLP v. Maxfield (In re Jennings), 199 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2006).

MCMULLAN_7.15.20

504

7/15/2020 2:02 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

McKinsey has not disclosed any connections at the beginning of the bankruptcy
procedure, but only later after the process was already well underway, if at all.209
Additionally, even after the late disclosures, McKinsey has failed to detail a
complete list of connections, such as in the Alpha Natural Resources case, where
Duke Energy, a client of McKinsey’s, was also a major customer of Alpha
Natural Resources.210 In its response to Alix’s previous assertions that
McKinsey is not disinterested, McKinsey has stated that clients of the main
McKinsey consulting services are separate from clients of McKinsey RTS, as
well as that McKinsey’s investment division, MIO, is a separate organization;
however, these claims ring hollow since McKinsey RTS and MIO share various
directors and board members.211 In conclusion, McKinsey violated the
disclosure requirements as required by the test promulgated in In re Jennings, as
required by Rule 2014(a).
In addition to the questions posed in the bankruptcy context, above, the case
against McKinsey also alleges various criminal actions.212
d. Criminal Allegations
There are various criminal allegations against McKinsey, for which it is
helpful to have a brief overview of the allegations, as well as the elements
necessary to prove them. These allegations include: bankruptcy fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152(3), and 152(6); mail fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1341; wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; obstruction of
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a); witness tampering in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1512(b) and 1512(c); unlawful monetary transactions in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957; inducement to interstate or foreign travel in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314; and promissory estoppel.213 These allegations
clearly hinge on whether McKinsey satisfied the tests above, but the allegations
also have their own requirements. While it is impossible to determine whether
McKinsey satisfied each element of these various crimes until discovery reveals
McKinsey’s thought-processes in the bankruptcy process, it is worth noting

209

See Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 21–32.
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 51. Full details of the connections McKinsey allegedly
hid can be found in the Complaint and Jury demand.
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Complaint
and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 32.
212
Discussed infra Section B(4)(d).
213
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2.
210

MCMULLAN_7.15.20

2020]

7/15/2020 2:02 PM

JAY ALIX, MCKINSEY, AND A LACK OF CLARITY

505

some of the crimes alleged and the elements necessary to prove them, and
analyzing the ones for which sufficient facts are apparent.
In his suit, Alix alleges McKinsey committed bankruptcy fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 152(3), and 152(6).214 These provisions provide that a
person who “(2) knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or
in relation to” any bankruptcy case; “(3) knowingly and fraudulently makes a
false declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury
as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, or in relation to any” bankruptcy;
“[or] (6) knowingly and fraudulently gives, offers, receives, or attempts to obtain
any money or property, remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or
promise thereof for acting or forbearing to act in any” bankruptcy case “shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”215
This crime is fairly straightforward: if McKinsey is a professional under the
Code and required to be disinterested and meet the requirements of Rule
2014(a), then it will be guilty provided that its inadequate disclosures and claims
to be disinterested were knowingly dishonest. Clearly McKinsey knew that it
had connections to interested parties in the bankruptcies it was involved—the
only question remaining is whether it truly believed these connections did not
fall under the disclosure requirements, or whether it knew that the connections
were supposed to be disclosed, yet hid them anyway. If McKinsey knew these
connections fell under the disclosure requirements, McKinsey clearly committed
bankruptcy fraud. An individual violates 18 U.S.C. § 1956 if:
knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, he conducts
or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful . . . knowing that the
transaction is designed in whole or in part . . . to conceal or disguise
the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity.216

Proving mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341requires satisfying two
elements: “(1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc. for the
purpose of executing the scheme.”217 Additionally, the scheme need not have
“contemplate[d] the use of the mails as an essential element.”218
214

Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2.
18 U.S.C. § 152 (2018).
216
United States v. Dennis, 237 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i))
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The crime of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 requires proving
two elements: “(1) a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of interstate
communications in furtherance of the scheme.”219
Wire fraud and mail fraud will be relatively easy to prove if Alix is able to
prove that McKinsey knowingly and fraudulently lied about its disclosures in
the bankruptcy cases on which it worked. If it truly did so knowingly, it will be
clear that McKinsey was engaged in an ongoing scheme to defraud, as the fraud
continued over multiple years and bankruptcies.
It has been formulated by at least one court that proving obstruction of justice
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) requires: 1) a nexus between the individual’s
conduct and judicial proceedings; 2) the conduct must have relation in time,
causation, or logic with judicial proceedings and must have natural and probable
effect of interfering with due administration of justice; 3) the individual must
have had specific intent to do some act or acts which tend to influence, obstruct,
or impede due administration of justice; 4) the individual’s motivation is
irrelevant under § 1503(a); and 5) where the individual unquestionably intended
to undertake the act, with full knowledge that it would impede due
administration of justice, that is all law requires in order to show specific intent
to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice.220
To prove violations of inducement to interstate or foreign travel in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, one must establish the following elements: “(1) unlawful
or fraudulent intent in the (2) transportation in interstate commerce of (3) any
falsely made securities with (4) knowledge that securities were falsely made.”221
Punishment can be imposed in the form of a fine or imprisonment of up to ten
years, or both.222 This analysis is closely tied to that of the bankruptcy fraud, as
whether or not McKinsey truly had fraudulent intent is the main consideration
of that charge, as well as the first element of this charge.223
In the case’s sixth cause of action, Alix asserts promissory estoppel, stating
that on October 16, 2014, McKinsey & Co., through its Managing Partner
Dominic Barton, promised AlixPartners that it would dissolve McKinsey RTS
“because of its unlawful activity, and cease providing bankruptcy consulting
services [by] January 2015.”224 As a result of this promise, AlixPartners
219
220
221
222
223
224

United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1171 (5th Cir. 1986).
Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Mitchell, 588 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1979).
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2018).
Mitchell, 588 F.2d at 483.
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refrained from commencing litigation against McKinsey for the illegal practices
described above, but McKinsey breached its promise to AlixPartners by
continuing to provide bankruptcy consulting services to debtors after January
2015.225 The elements of promissory estoppel are: “(1) defendant made an
unambiguous promise to plaintiff; (2) plaintiff relied on such promise; (3)
plaintiff’s reliance was expected and foreseeable by defendants; and (4) plaintiff
relied on the promise to its detriment.”226
This claim of promissory estoppel stems from an October 16, 2014 meeting,
in which Alix and Dominic Barton, a global managing partner at McKinsey &
Co., discussed McKinsey’s alleged pay-to-play operation.227 After an initial
meeting in which Alix disclosed to Barton that he believed McKinsey’s actions
were illegal under the Code, Barton ask for some time to review the applicable
law and McKinsey’s action, after which Barton had determined the behavior was
illegal and “expressed incredulity” that the directors of McKinsey RTS would
engage in such conduct.228 Barton then promised that, after his upcoming reelection as managing partner, he would remove the senior leadership of
McKinsey RTS from their positions due to their illegal behavior, as well as
remove McKinsey from the bankruptcy business altogether—in return, Alix
would “remain patient and refrain from acting at that time on the issues he had
raised.”229 The promised actions never occurred, however, resulting in the
inclusion of this cause of action, because Alix did not bring litigation in reliance
on the promise by Barton.
This cause of action is not likely to succeed—there is no true detrimental
reliance. Alix claims that as a result of the promises by Barton, he did not bring
legal action against McKinsey. While we only have Alix’s side of the story, his
record of events seems to make clear that Barton made an unambiguous promise
to Alix to shut down the operations of McKinsey’s restructuring group, thus the
first element is satisfied. Additionally, there seems to be no doubt the Alix
reasonably relied on the promise. The issue, however, lies in Alix’s claim of
injury as a result of this reliance. His injury, he claims, is that he did not bring
litigation against McKinsey, and thus missed out on potential damages from
litigation.230 This argument holds no weight, however, as Alix is currently
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bringing litigation, and thus is eligible for damages that will remedy the past
transgressions against him. A better argument would be that he was damaged by
not obtaining several bankruptcy cases that occurred after the meeting in which
Barton allegedly promised to exit the bankruptcy business and not seek any new
cases. However, even this argument is baseless, as this injury is entirely
speculative—there is no way to determine that, even in the absence of
McKenzie, Alix would have been awarded the bankruptcy contract over some
other consulting firm.
CONCLUSION
The recently filed case Alix v. McKinsey & Co. is an excellent tool to reveal
several deficiencies in the bankruptcy system. While it is not entirely clear
whether McKinsey & Co.’s restructuring group, McKinsey RTS, knew what the
proper amount of disclosures required of them are and simply flouted these
requirements in an attempt to maintain their brand reputation of client
confidentiality, or whether they believed that a minimum level of disclosures
was required to satisfy the disclosure requirements set forth in Rule 2014(a) and
that they truly did qualify as disinterest under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). Either way,
the case has brought to the forefront of bankruptcy the reality that the definition
of who qualifies as a professional under § 327(a), who qualifies as disinterested
under § 327(a), and what are the full extent of the disclosure requirements under
Rule 2014(a) is not clear. This lack of clarity has resulted in circuit splits and
even splits within circuits regarding who is subject to the disinterested
requirement under § 327(a), what this disinterested requirement entails, and how
much information a professional seeking employment in a bankruptcy case must
divulge to the bankruptcy court under Rule 2014(a).
The court in Alix v. McKinsey & Co. has an opportunity to resolve some of
these definitional issues. This Comment suggests the following solutions. First,
the court should adopt the six-part test for defining professional as set out by the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Am. Tissue, Inc., in which
the court considers: (1) whether the employee controls, manages, administers,
invests, purchases or sells assets that are significant to the debtor’s
reorganization; (2) whether the employee is involved in negotiating the terms of
a Plan of Reorganization; (3) whether the employment is directly related to the
type of work carried out by the debtor or to the routine maintenance of the
debtor’s business operations; (4) whether the employee is given discretion or
autonomy to exercise his or her own professional judgment in some part of the
administration of the debtor’s estate; (5) the extent of the employee’s
involvement in the administration of the debtor’s estate; and (6) whether the
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employee’s services involve some degree of special knowledge or skill, such
that the employee can be considered a “professional” within the ordinary
meaning of the term.231 Second, the court should adopt the strict definition of
disinterested as set out by the Fourth Circuit in In re Martin, where the Court
considers the totality of the circumstances in its determination of whether the
professional is disinterested.232 Third, the court should establish a broad
disclosure rule similar to the rule set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in In re
Jennings, where the Court required professionals to “disclose all facts that bear
on his disinterestedness, and cannot usurp the court’s function by unilaterally
choosing which connections impact on his disinterestedness and which do
not.”233
While the allegations against McKinsey are serious and, if true, represent a
threat to the fairness and effectiveness of the bankruptcy system, they also offer
the opportunity to fix aspects of the bankruptcy system that have holes, allowing
the court to ensure that such actions, are not repeated. The court has an
opportunity to prevent further confusion and lack of cohesion between
bankruptcy jurisdictions, and it may capitalize on this opportunity by adopting
the tests and requirements set forth above.
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